Intrinsic Fail-Open Architecture

An engineering position paper on the failure behavior of the AquaFlow Water Flow Stabilization Device: architecture, FMEA, fault tree analysis, risk assessment, and sixteen-year field record.

RECORDED FAILURES*	INSTALLED BASE	BODY MATERIAL	CLOSURE MEMBER
0	25,000+	316L	None



Open axial flow path - no closure member, no seat, no actuator, no control input. Schematic; see Figure 1.

**Current-generation sealed design, 2010 to present. Engineering position, not a warranty; AF-LGL-001 governs warranty terms.*

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AQUAFLOW TECHNOLOGIES · ENGINEERING POSITION STATEMENT · AF-TEC-010 · REV 2.3 · 2026

Fail-Safe Behavior of the AquaFlow Water Flow Stabilization Device

AquaFlow Technologies, as designer and manufacturer of the AquaFlow Water Flow Stabilization Device (AF series), states the following engineering position. Each position is demonstrated, not merely asserted, in the section cited.

1. **The device contains no closure member.** It is a passive in-line flow-conditioning device with no gate, ball, disc, or seat; no actuator, spring, or solenoid; no external power; and no control input. No component capable of obstructing the pipeline exists in the design, and no "closed" state exists for the device to fail into. *(Sections 3–5, Figures 1–2.)*

2. **Line isolation by the device is not a credible failure outcome.** Fault tree analysis shows every postulated path to supply interruption requires at least one basic event that is structurally absent from the design. *(Section 8, Figure 6.)*

3. **By design, the device fails open.** The consequence of any postulated internal failure mode is loss of the flow-conditioning function — an economic effect — never loss of water supply. Formal FMEA with severity, occurrence, detection, and residual-risk ratings supports this. *(Section 7.)*

4. **Field record.** Since introduction of the current-generation sealed design in 2010, AquaFlow has no recorded in-service functional failure of the device, across more than 25,000 installations and sixteen years of service. *(Section 9.)*

5. **Design basis.** The current generation eliminated the elastomeric O-ring seals of the pre-2010 design — historically the only degradation path — in favor of a permanently cemented sealed core, captive within a 316L stainless steel body; maintenance-free, unpowered, 20–180 PSI, negligible pressure loss. *(Sections 5–6, AF-TEC-001.)*

6. **Commercial backstop.** The device carries a lifetime warranty and a six-month money-back guarantee as stated in the written agreement (AF-LGL-001 / AF-LGL-002).

This statement describes design behavior and the field record to date under the scope, assumptions, and limitations stated in Section 1. It is an engineering position, not a performance guarantee or warranty; warranty terms are governed exclusively by the controlling warranty document and executed agreement.

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REVIEWER DASHBOARD · ONE-PAGE INSTRUMENT

Findings, Falsification Criteria & Checklist

RECORDED FAILURES*	INSTALLED BASE	MAX FMEA RPN (THRESHOLD 100)	FREE DEGREES OF FREEDOM
0	25,000+	16	0 of 6

*Current-generation sealed design, 2010–2026, fleet-wide; observability basis Section 9.3.

Key engineering findings

	Finding	Where
F1	The machinery of line isolation (closure member, seating interface, drive, command path) is absent from the design — a hardware property, inspectable on any unit.	§3–6, Fig. 1
F2	No FMEA mode combines supply-relevant severity with credible occurrence; fault tree finds no complete path to supply interruption.	§7–8, Fig. 6
F3	Internal assembly: zero free DOF, redundantly restrained; equilibrium closes with margin; shell safety factor > 5 at the envelope for any practical wall ratio; worst shell case is leak-before-break.	§5.4–5.6
F4	In reliability-block terms the device enters the supply chain only as pipework-class structure; its function chain has no element in series with supply.	§9.4, Fig. 8
F5	Residual risks: loss of savings function (economic, monitored monthly, warrantied) and joint workmanship (pipework-class). Supply interruption is not plottable — no mechanism.	§8, Fig. 7

What would falsify this paper

- A reachable device state, or physically defined transition, with the bore obstructed (§3).
- A worksheet-defensible failure mode rating supply-relevant severity with occurrence > 1 (§7).
- A complete AND-path through Figure 6 whose basic events all exist in the hardware (§8).

What this paper does not claim

- Not a warranty (AF-LGL-001 governs) and not a savings-performance document (AF-GOV-001 governs).
- No ISO/IEC/MIL-STD certification — methodology references only.
- Not PE-sealed; site-specific review remains with the engineer of record.
- Not applicable outside the published potable envelope (§1.2, §8.5).

Reviewer checklist (independent, no AquaFlow data required except where noted)

	Step
	Inspect any unit against the Figure 1 absence register (minutes, hardware-level).
	Re-run the parametric stress table (§5.5) from ASTM A240 minima; re-derive the bond-shear bound (§5.4).
	Audit the FMEA ratings against the published scales (§7); attempt the falsifying entry.
	Walk each fault-tree branch (Fig. 6) and challenge any basic-event disposition.
	Request evidence-library documents (AF-EVD-001/002/003/004/006) and verify with issuers.
	For formal diligence: request dimensional data and fleet unit-years under NDA (§9.2a).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR ENGINEERING REVIEWERS

What This Paper Demonstrates, and How

The claim under review is narrow: **no failure mode of the AquaFlow device can interrupt the water supply it is installed on.** Three independent lines of evidence are presented, each sufficient to be examined on its own:

	Line of evidence
1	**Architecture** — the machinery of closure (closure member, seating interface, drive, command path) is absent from the design. This is inspectable on hardware and stated formally as a five-premise logic chain. *Sections 2–6, Figures 1–3.*
2	**Failure analysis** — a design FMEA with published S/O/D scales finds no mode that combines supply-relevant severity with credible occurrence; a fault tree shows every path to the top event terminates in absent hardware. *Sections 7–8, Figure 6.*
3	**Field record** — zero recorded in-service functional failures of the current generation across 25,000+ installations and sixteen years, with unusually strong observability (monthly M&V on customer-owned meter data). Presented as corroboration, never as proof. *Section 9.*

ARCHITECTURE — what the design lacks — Sections 2–6 → **ANALYSIS** — FMEA · fault tree · states — Sections 7–8 → **RECORD** — 16 yr · 25,000+ · zero — Section 9 → **POSITION** — fail-open, intrinsically signed, p.2

The argument architecture: each stage is independent; the position survives the loss of any one of the first three.

Read in this order (approx. 20 minutes)

Signed statement (p.2) → Figure 1 schematic and absence register (Section 3) → isolation logic chain (Section 6) → FMEA method and worksheet (Section 7) → fault tree (Figure 6) → risk matrix and register transfer (Section 8) → field record (Section 9). Evidence-classification rules for every claim in this paper are on the next-but-one page.

Limits, stated plainly

This is an engineering position, not a warranty (AF-LGL-001 governs) and not a professional engineering certification (Section 12). FMEA and risk-matrix ratings are design-review judgments per published scales, anchored to the field record — not accelerated-life statistics. Methodology references (ISO, IEC, MIL-STD, NASA, ASTM) describe the analytical approach only; no certification or compliance is implied. Savings performance is out of scope entirely.

The one-sentence version: whether or not this device ever fails, the failure is confined by architecture to the function the device adds — conditioning and savings — because the hardware required to take away what the pipe already does (pass water) is not present in the design.

SECTION 1 · SCOPE, BASIS & LIMITATIONS

Scope of This Position Paper

1.1 Purpose and audience

This paper documents the engineering basis for the failure behavior of the AquaFlow Water Flow Stabilization Device. It is written for consulting engineers, utility and facility engineers, EPC reviewers, insurers, and technically sophisticated procurement organizations evaluating whether insertion of the device introduces a supply-interruption risk to a water service.

1.2 Scope

In scope: the mechanical architecture of the current-generation (2010–present) AF-series device; postulated internal failure modes and their effects; the credibility of line isolation as a failure outcome; and the field record. Out of scope: savings performance (governed by AF-TEC-002 and the claims framework AF-GOV-001), installation practice (AF-TEC-003/005), and warranty terms (AF-LGL-001/002).

1.3 Design assumptions

Ref	Assumption
A1	Device installed per AF-TEC-003 by a licensed plumber, within the published envelope: 20–180 PSI operating pressure, sizes 1/2”–26”, horizontal or vertical orientation.
A2	Potable-water service; media consistent with municipal supply. Aggressive or debris-laden media are a system-design consideration for all line components equally (Section 8, Branch B).
A3	The analysis addresses the device itself. Joints to adjacent pipework share the risk class of any equivalent 316L fitting and are treated as such in the FMEA (FM-04).

1.4 Limitations

Ratings in the FMEA and risk matrix are qualitative engineering judgments per the stated scales, anchored to the field record; they are not derived from accelerated life testing. References to ISO, IEC, MIL-STD, and NASA material describe the analytical *methodology* followed; they do not assert certification or compliance, and none is implied. The internal stabilization assembly is proprietary; figures show it as a sealed envelope with its mechanical constraints, which is sufficient for the isolation argument because that argument depends only on what the design *lacks*.

1.5 Engineering basis — documents of record

AF-TEC-001 (specification: materials, envelope, pressure loss); AF-TEC-004 (hydraulic engineering monograph and literature base, incl. ASTM G32-16 erosion context); AF-TEC-002 (measurement & verification method by which loss of function is detected); AF-TEC-003/005 (installation and code reference); the AF-REF external source library. Full bibliography in Section 11.

Product identification. AF-series Water Flow Stabilization Device — 316L stainless steel body, integral flange lip, sealed internal assembly. Sizes 1/2”–26”; threaded or flanged end connections. Product photograph; dimensional data and section schematic in AF-TEC-001 and Figure 1 of this paper.

SECTION 1.6 · EVIDENCE DISCIPLINE

What Is Fact, What Is Judgment, What Is Advice

Every claim in this paper belongs to one of three classes, and the class is visible from the language used. A reviewer should hold each class to its own standard — and is invited to.

Class	Standard it must meet	Examples in this paper
VERIFIED FACT	Inspectable on hardware or in a controlling document.	Absence register (Fig. 1); materials and envelope (AF-TEC-001); elimination of elastomers in the 2010 redesign.
INDEPENDENT CERTIFICATION	Issued by an accredited third party; verifiable with the issuer.	IAPMO Certificate of Listing K-17679 (AF-EVD-001); Kiwa UK Regulation 4 certificate (AF-EVD-006). Materials/regulatory scope only — never performance proof.
LABORATORY EVIDENCE	Bench or laboratory testing by a named organization, documented in the evidence library.	MARS Company bench test (AF-EVD-002); University of Maine testing report (AF-EVD-003); IAPMO lab meter-impact test (AF-EVD-004). Cited for what each establishes; available under the evidence library's handling rules.
FIELD EVIDENCE	The in-service record, with its observability stated.	Zero recorded in-service failures 2010–2026 across 25,000+ installations, monitored monthly via customer-owned meter data (Section 9.3).
MATHEMATICAL / PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS	Closed-form results from published formulas and published material minima; reproducible by any reader with no AquaFlow data.	Hoop-stress safety-factor table and fatigue screening (Section 5.5); bond-shear bound and DOF disposition (Section 5.4); rule-of-three confidence bound (Section 9.2a).
ENGINEERING ANALYSIS / JUDGMENT	Design-review reasoning per published scales and stated premises; testable and falsifiable by the reader.	FMEA S/O/D ratings (Section 7); fault-tree dispositions (Fig. 6); the isolation logic chain (Section 6).
INDUSTRY LITERATURE	Third-party research, codes, texts, and standards AquaFlow cites but did not author.	HR Wallingford SR 649; Gilley; ASTM/ASME/AWWA material; the AF-REF source library (preserved in original form). Full bibliography, Section 11.
MANUFACTURER STATEMENT / RECOMMENDATION	AquaFlow's own position or advice; adopt or adapt under the engineer of record.	The signed statement (p.2); suggested specification language (Section 10.2); risk-register transfer rows (Section 8.3).

Terms used precisely in this paper

Term	Definition as used here
Fail-open	On any internal failure, the flow path remains open; only the conditioning function is at risk. Used here in the intrinsic sense of Section 2.2 — a geometric property, not an engineered behavior.
Closure member	Any element (gate, ball, disc, plug, poppet, diaphragm) capable of being positioned across the bore against a seating interface.
Passive device	Performs its function by fixed geometry: no moving functional element, no stored actuation energy, no command interface.
Device boundary	The 316L body and its end connections. Joints to adjacent pipework are included in the FMEA as shared-risk items (FM-04) and marked as such.
Functional failure	Loss or degradation of the conditioning function. Distinct from supply interruption, which requires line isolation — a different physical event with different prerequisites.
Recorded in-service failure	A functional failure of a fielded current-generation device reported to or detected by AquaFlow, including via M&V trend review. Count since 2010: zero.

SECTION 2 · DESIGN PHILOSOPHY

Intrinsic Safety: Elimination, Not Mitigation

The hierarchy of hazard control in engineering design places **elimination of the hazard mechanism** above every form of guarding, interlock, procedure, or warning (ISO 12100-style thinking). The AquaFlow device applies that hierarchy to the hazard that matters in a water line: unintended isolation of supply.

2.1 Passive versus active devices

An **active** device performs its function by moving: it stores or receives energy (spring, solenoid, actuator, pilot pressure) and applies it to a movable element. Its failure modes therefore include unintended motion — among them, motion toward the closed state. A **passive** device performs its function by geometry alone: it has no moving functional element, no stored actuation energy, and no command interface. Its failure modes are limited to degradation of the fixed geometry — which, in an open-channel device, degrades *function*, not *passage*.

2.2 Fail-safe taxonomy applied correctly

Class	Behavior on failure
Fail-closed	Device moves to, or remains in, the closed position on loss of power/signal. Correct for fuel, steam, and hazardous-media isolation. Wrong for a potable supply that must not be interrupted.
Fail-last / fail-in-place	Device holds last position. Indeterminate outcome: the failure state depends on the state at the moment of failure.
Fail-open (engineered)	An active device driven open on failure by spring or stored energy. Better — but the fail-safe behavior itself depends on a mechanism that can also fail.
Fail-open (intrinsic)	The open state is not achieved by a mechanism; it is the only state the hardware can occupy, because the machinery of closure is absent. This is the AquaFlow architecture: the fail-safe property cannot itself fail, because it is not a behavior — it is the geometry.

2.3 Single-point-failure analysis and redundancy by elimination

Conventional practice protects a supply-critical line from a valve's failure modes with redundancy: bypass loops, parallel trains, limit switches, supervision. Each addition raises part count, and reliability engineering treats part count as a first-order driver of system failure probability — every component contributes its own failure modes. The alternative is **redundancy by elimination**: remove the failure mechanism instead of duplicating defenses against it. A single-point-failure review of the AquaFlow device finds no single point — or combination of points — whose failure isolates the line, because isolation requires machinery the device does not contain (demonstrated formally in Sections 6 and 8).

SECTION 2 · DESIGN PHILOSOPHY (CONTINUED)

The Energy Audit: What Could Drive a Failure?

Mechanical reliability engineering begins with an inventory of the energy available to do damage or cause unintended motion. A failure outcome requires both a mechanism and an energy source to drive it.

Energy source	Status	Engineering consequence
Stored mechanical (springs, preloaded elements)	None in design	No spring return, no preloaded closure element to release.
Electrical (solenoids, motors, sensors)	None in design	Unpowered. No coil to fail energized or de-energized.
Pneumatic / pilot hydraulic	None in design	No diaphragm, pilot line, or control chamber.
Control / signal (commands, logic)	None in design	No input by which any state change could be commanded.
Line hydraulic energy (pressure, transients)	**Present — bounded**	The only energy acting on the device. It loads the pressure boundary in hoop tension (Figure 2); rated envelope 20–180 PSI. There is no movable element for it to reposition.
Chemical (corrosion potential of media)	**Present — addressed by material**	316L wetted construction; Section 5. Gradual surface effect; no closure consequence.

The philosophy in one sentence: the device is designed so that the only energy present (line pressure) has nothing to act on except a fixed 316L pressure boundary — there is no stored energy, no movable element, and no command path by which any failure could express itself as closure.

2.4 Design simplification as a reliability strategy

Every functional element removed from a design removes its failure modes with it. Relative to an actuated control valve, the AquaFlow device eliminates the stem and stem seals, the seat and seating interface, the actuator and its power or air supply, position feedback, and the elastomeric dynamic seals — and with them: stem seizure, seat wear, actuator failure, signal failure, packing leaks, and seal extrusion. What remains is a bonded assembly inside a static pressure vessel. The 2010 redesign (Section 6) completed this simplification by eliminating the last elastomer.

SECTION 3 · DEVICE ARCHITECTURE

Annotated Section View



Figure 1 — Schematic axial section, AF-series device (balloons keyed to the table below). What this figure establishes: the absence register is a **hardware property** *— every element required for line closure is verifiably missing from the assembly, at inspection level, on any unit. Proprietary internals appear as the sealed envelope because the argument uses only what the design lacks. Illustrative; not to scale; dimensional data AF-TEC-001, p.3.*

#	Element	Engineering description
1	**Body / pressure boundary**	316L stainless steel; integral flange lip or threaded ends; 1/2”–26”; rated envelope 20–180 PSI.
2	**Sealed stabilization assembly**	Annular, permanently cemented to the body wall (2010–present). No elastomers, no serviceable parts, no scheduled maintenance. Captive by bond and by geometry.
3	**Axial flow channel**	Open, full-flow; no seat, orifice plate, pilot passage, or control port. Peak estimated pressure loss < 0.8 PSI across the series (AF-TEC-001).
—	**Absence register**	**Not present anywhere in the assembly:** gate, ball, disc, plug, seat, stem, packing, spring, diaphragm, solenoid, actuator, position indicator, sensor, control connection, external power.

The absence register is the load-bearing row of that table. In a conventional valve datasheet, the component list explains how the valve closes. Here, the component list demonstrates that closure has no hardware to happen with. Section 6 states this formally.

SECTION 3 · DEVICE ARCHITECTURE (CONTINUED)

Load Path and Mechanical Constraint

PRESSURE LOAD PATH: internal pressure (blue) loads the body wall in hoop tension (green), reacted by the 316L shell and flanged joints. No load path crosses the bore.



There is no stem, gate, disc, or spring for pressure or wear to act on: hydraulic loads terminate in the pressure boundary, never in a movable element. Schematic - illustrative, not to scale.

Figure 2 — Pressure load path (schematic). What this figure establishes: every hydraulic load terminates in the static pressure boundary — there is no movable element for pressure, transient, or wear to reposition, so the load path itself forecloses the failure-to-closed scenario.

Load	Path / reaction	Closure relevance
Hydrostatic pressure (20–180 PSI)	Hoop and axial tension in the 316L shell; joint preload at flanges	**Static pressure boundary — same structural class as adjacent pipe**
Hydraulic transients / water hammer	Short-duration pressure excursion on the same boundary	**No movable element to slam, chatter, or be driven onto a seat**
Flow-induced forces on internals	Reacted continuously along the cemented annular bond line	**Distributed bond, not a point fastener; no hinge or pivot to fatigue**
Thermal expansion (potable range)	Uniform; assembly and body are bonded — no differential sliding interface	**No clearance to close up, no interference to seize**

Two constraint facts carry the argument. First, the assembly is **captive**: bonded continuously to the body wall, it has no degree of freedom in which to translate or rotate into the bore. Second, the assembly is **annular**: even under the non-credible postulate of complete bond release, the geometry that would have to present itself across the full bore does not exist as a single spanning element. These are the basic events tested — and failed — by Branch C of the fault tree (Figure 6).

SECTION 3 · FUNCTIONAL STATES

State Analysis: Every Reachable State Keeps the Supply Open

A state diagram makes the fail-open claim testable: enumerate every state the device can occupy, and check the supply status in each. The claim fails if any reachable state — or any defined transition — touches the water column.



Figure 3 — Functional-state diagram. Transitions S0→S1→S2 are hypothetical (zero recorded occurrences on the current generation); each degrades only the conditioning function, and the supply badge is identical in every reachable state. A "closed" state cannot be added to this diagram without also adding the hardware of Section 4's survey — which is the point.

Why state enumeration is decisive

For an active valve, the state set necessarily includes CLOSED, and fail-safe analysis must show the device avoids it under failure — a probabilistic argument. For this device the state set does not contain CLOSED at all, so no probability needs to be argued: the analysis reduces to verifying the state set itself, which any reviewer can do against the absence register (Figure 1) and the constraint facts (Figure 2). This is the practical difference between *demonstrating* a fail-open property and *promising* one.

Falsifiability: to defeat this analysis, a reviewer must exhibit a reachable device state, or a physically defined transition, in which the bore is obstructed. The authors know of no such state; Sections 7–8 record the systematic search for one.

SECTION 4 · CLOSURE-MECHANISM SURVEY

How Lines Actually Get Closed: A Survey of Nine Mechanisms

Every in-line device that has ever isolated a pipe did it with a closure element driven across a seating interface. The survey below is exhaustive over common waterworks hardware.

Device class	Closure element	Seating interface	Drive / energy	Can fail closed?
Gate valve	Wedge / gate	Body seats	Stem + handwheel or actuator	Yes — stem drift, seizure, operator error
Ball valve	Rotating ball	Seat rings	Lever / actuator	Yes — quarter-turn to closed
Butterfly valve	Disc on shaft	Liner / seat	Lever / gear / actuator	Yes — disc rotates closed
Globe / control valve	Plug	Seat ring	Actuator + positioner	Yes — signal or actuator failure
Solenoid valve	Plunger / diaphragm	Orifice seat	Electric coil	Yes — typical NC design closes on power loss
Pressure-reducing valve	Disc via diaphragm	Seat	Spring + pilot pressure	Yes — pilot blockage / diaphragm failure can close
Check valve	Disc / poppet	Seat	Flow reversal + spring	Yes — can stick closed against forward flow
Relief valve	Disc	Nozzle seat	Spring	N/A to line flow, but seat + spring present
AquaFlow device	**None**	**None**	**None**	**No — no element, seat, or drive exists**

The pattern is uniform: fail-closed potential enters with the closure element and its drive, without exception. It is not a matter of quality or brand; it is what the hardware is. The AquaFlow device is the degenerate case of the table — the row where all three enabling columns are empty — and its failure behavior follows from that emptiness, not from a claim.

Survey level: mechanism class. Individual products vary in seat design and actuation; none varies in needing a closure element to close. Terminology per common waterworks practice (AWWA C-series product families).

SECTION 5 · HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS (CONCEPTUAL)

Flow Continuity Through an Open Channel

5.1 Conservation of mass

The device contains no storage volume, no branch, and no vent: in steady state, mass flow in equals mass flow out. For incompressible service this is the continuity relation:

$$Q = V \cdot A = \text{constant} \rightarrow V_1 A_1 = V_2 A_2$$

Because the axial channel is open and of full-flow proportion (AF-TEC-001 characterizes series hydraulics against full-port check-valve references), the area ratio through the device remains near unity: there is no orifice, seat bore, or pilot passage whose small diameter would dominate the system's hydraulic behavior or present a preferential blockage site.

5.2 Energy: pressure loss in context

The governing equations are the Navier–Stokes momentum balance, applied in engineering form as the steady energy equation with a loss term; the device enters as a minor-loss coefficient K:

$$p/\rho g + V^2/2g + z = \text{const} - h_L \quad h_{L,\text{device}} = K \cdot V^2/2g \quad \Delta p = K \cdot \rho V^2/2 \quad Re = \rho V D/\mu$$

The published peak estimated loss is **< 0.8 PSI** across the series (AF-TEC-001), which bounds K at fitting-class values across the flow range — against a 20–180 PSI operating envelope, a minor loss on the order of a pipe fitting, not a throttling element. Municipal service is fully turbulent (Re well above transition throughout the published flow range), the regime in which minor-loss coefficients are stable and the published bound is meaningful. A device that throttled meaningfully would announce itself on the energy grade line; this one does not. (Minor-loss framework per Crane TP-410 and Idelchik; Section 11.4.)

5.3 Blockage credibility

Blockage prerequisite	Status in this design
Small internal passages that clog first	**None — no pilot, orifice, or control port**
A seat for debris to lodge and seal against	**None — no seating interface exists**
A strainer element with a service interval	**None — the device is not a strainer and captures nothing**
Debris of full bore diameter arriving at the device	**A site condition affecting every component on the line equally; the device adds no capture feature and therefore no incremental blockage risk over plain pipe**

Formally: the device's incremental blockage risk over the pipe it replaces is bounded by its deviation from plain-pipe geometry, and that deviation contains no capture mechanism. This is Branch B of the fault tree, and it is why the branch terminates in a site condition rather than a device property.

Conceptual analysis: relations are stated to establish behavior class, not to compute site-specific values. Site hydraulic calculations remain the responsibility of the design engineer of record; AF-TEC-004 provides the extended hydraulic engineering treatment with literature citations.

SECTION 5 · MATERIALS ENGINEERING

Material Selection Rationale: 316L

Degradation class	Engineering response
General / crevice corrosion in potable service	316L austenitic stainless; molybdenum-bearing grade selected for chloride tolerance in municipal supply chemistry. Low-carbon ("L") variant resists sensitization.
Cavitation / erosion of wetted surfaces	Literature (Heymann 1992 and subsequent; surveyed in AF-TEC-004) places 316L's cavitation-erosion resistance at roughly 3× carbon steel; ASTM G32-16 is the reference test method. Erosion margin sets the service interval of the wetted surface — a gradual, function-side effect with no closure consequence.
Elastomer aging (the historical failure path)	Eliminated as a material class in 2010: no O-rings, gaskets-in-motion, or dynamic seals remain in the assembly. The cemented bond replaces the elastomer's retention function with a permanent joint that has no aging-to-release mechanism in potable service.
Dezincification / dealloying	Not applicable to the wetted construction: the body and internals are stainless, not a copper-alloy system.
Drinking-water contact	Components consistent with NSF/ANSI 61 drinking-water requirements; IAPMO-listed applications; ISO 9001-aligned quality management (AF-TEC-001, AF-EVD-001/006).

Why material selection belongs in a fail-safe paper

Materials govern the *rate* of every remaining degradation mode. Since Section 3 established that no degradation mode has a closure consequence, the material question reduces to: how long does the conditioning function last, and how visible is its decline? 316L answers the first with erosion and corrosion margin, and the M&V method (AF-TEC-002) answers the second — a measured savings trend on the customer's own meter data is a continuous, quantitative health monitor for the one thing the device can actually lose.

Detectability by design: the device's single consequential failure effect (loss of conditioning) is monitored monthly by the billing data itself. Few passive components enjoy a built-in, customer-owned instrument for their only failure effect.

SECTION 5.4 · MECHANICAL CONSTRAINT ANALYSIS

Degrees of Freedom: Quantifying “Captive”

“The assembly cannot migrate” is a claim; a constraint analysis is evidence. A rigid body has six degrees of freedom — three translations, three rotations. The table disposes of each.

Degree of freedom	Primary restraint (bond)	Redundant restraint (geometry)	Free
T_x — axial translation	Continuous cemented bond in shear along the full assembly length and circumference	Geometric interference: annulus OD exceeds both end-connection bores — axial exit is blocked in either direction even with zero bond	**0**
T_y, T_z — radial translation	Bond in tension/compression against the body wall	Radial gap does not exist: assembly seats on the wall it is bonded to	**0**
R_x — rotation about axis	Bond in torsional shear over the full contact area	No torque source exists: flow is axial; no vane loads a rotation	**0**
R_y, R_z — tilt	Bond moment resistance, distributed over the bond footprint	Annular geometry: tilt requires radial clearance that is not present	**0**

Result: zero free degrees of freedom, with every one of the six **redundantly** restrained — the bond and the geometry each suffice alone. This is the formal content of “captive” as used in Figures 1–2 and FTA Branch C.

Bond loading, bounded parametrically

The axial load on the bond is the pressure differential across the assembly acting on its frontal area: $F = \Delta p \cdot A_f$. Average bond shear is then $\tau = F / A_b = \Delta p \cdot (A_f / A_b)$. Two bounds govern. In service, $\Delta p < 0.8$ PSI (5.5 kPa) — the published device loss — so τ is a small fraction of even that small pressure, because the continuous bond area A_b (full circumference × assembly length) is a multiple of the frontal area A_f. Under the non-physical worst postulate that the *entire* line pressure (180 PSI) acted across the assembly, the same area ratio still divides it: the governing comparison is geometric, and it is visible in Figure 1. Bond capacity values are manufacturer-internal; the analysis above deliberately does not depend on them — and the even-if case (bond fully released) is already disposed of by the interference row of the table.

Even-if analysis, stated completely: with the bond removed from the analysis entirely, the released annulus is radially larger than either end-connection bore, cannot exit the body, cannot tilt into the bore for lack of clearance, and preserves its open central channel at any axial position within the body. The migration scenario fails on geometry alone. (Schematic geometry per Figure 1; dimensional data AF-TEC-001, available to the engineer of record.)

SECTION 5.5 · STRESS, FATIGUE & FRACTURE SCREENING

Shell Stresses: Parametric Screening Against Published 316L Minima

For a thin-walled cylinder under internal pressure, the classical (Lamé/membrane) results give hoop and axial stress, and the Von Mises equivalent for a closed cylinder:

$$\sigma_\theta = P \cdot D / 2t \quad \sigma_z = P \cdot D / 4t \quad \sigma_{VM} = (\sqrt{3}/2) \cdot \sigma_\theta \approx 0.87 \cdot \sigma_\theta$$

Wall ratios of specific SKUs are manufacturer data, so the screening is parametric: at the envelope maximum P = 180 PSI (1.24 MPa), hoop stress and the safety factor against the ASTM A240 minimum yield for 316L (170 MPa) are, for any diameter-to-thickness ratio D/t:

D/t (parametric)	Hoop stress σ_θ at 180 PSI	Von Mises σ_{VM}	Safety factor vs. $\sigma_{y,min}$ = 170 MPa
10	6.2 MPa	≈ 5.4 MPa	**27**
20	12.4 MPa	≈ 10.8 MPa	**14**
30	18.6 MPa	≈ 16.2 MPa	**9.1**
40	24.8 MPa	≈ 21.6 MPa	**6.9**
50	31.0 MPa	≈ 27.0 MPa	**5.5**

Pure membrane screening; no proprietary dimensions used. Any practical waterworks wall ratio (D/t well below 50) leaves the shell at a safety factor above 5 against first yield — consistent with treating the body as pipework-class structure (FM-05). Design-margin philosophy per ASME pressure-vessel practice; formulas per Roark and Timoshenko (Section 11.4).

316L material properties (published minima / typical values)

Property	Value	Property	Value
Yield strength (0.2%)	**≥ 170 MPa (25 ksi)**	Tensile strength	**≥ 485 MPa (70 ksi)**
Elongation	**≥ 40%**	Elastic modulus	**≈ 193 GPa**
Density	**≈ 8.0 g/cm³**	Thermal expansion (0–100°C)	**≈ 15.9 µm/m·K**
Thermal conductivity	**≈ 16.2 W/m·K**	PREN (Cr + 3.3Mo + 16N)	**≈ 24–26**

Minima per ASTM A240/A240M for UNS S31603; physical values typical published data. Cited as material context, not as a certificate of a specific heat.

Fatigue and fracture screening

Fatigue: the only cyclic driver is line-pressure fluctuation, bounded by the 20–180 PSI envelope; the corresponding stress amplitude (table above) is an order of magnitude below the high-cycle fatigue strength commonly reported for austenitic stainless steels (≈ 0.35–0.5 of tensile strength, i.e. ≈ 170–240 MPa amplitude) — the S–N (Basquin) regime is not entered. There is no rotating, sliding, or vibrating element to add a mechanical cycle, and no threaded feature in the flow path to concentrate stress. **Fracture:** 316L is a high-toughness, ductile austenite; sustained crack growth requires a cyclic stress-intensity range above threshold ($\Delta K > \Delta K_{th}$), and the screening above identifies no driver capable of supplying it. Both mechanisms are therefore screened out as initiators — consistent with the FMEA occurrence anchors and with sixteen years of field silence. Screening level: parametric; site-specific verification remains with the engineer of record.

SECTION 5.6 · STATIC EQUILIBRIUM & REMAINING STRUCTURAL SCREENINGS

Free-Body Analysis of the Internal Assembly

The constraint table (Section 5.4) says what restrains the assembly; the free-body diagram shows the loads balancing. Isolate the assembly, apply every load acting on it, and check equilibrium.



S F = 0 : Dp x Af = t x Ab   S M = 0 : symmetric annular loading - no net moment, no couple to tilt

Boundary conditions: continuously bonded on outer surface (fixed); wetted inner surface pressure-loaded; ends free of attachment - nothing to transfer load into the bore.

Figure 5 — Free-body diagram (half-section, schematic). The only sustained applied load is the axial pressure differential on the frontal area ($\Delta p < 0.8$ PSI in service); it is reacted by distributed shear along the continuous bond. Radial pressure is reacted normal to the wall the assembly is bonded against. Equilibrium closes with margin at every line of the audit.

Remaining structural screenings

Screening	Disposition
External-pressure buckling	Worst credible external loading (flooded vault, burial) is on the order of 1 atmosphere; collapse of a thick-walled, small-diameter 316L shell requires external pressure orders beyond that, and internal line pressure normally opposes it. Screened out.
Torsion	No operating torque exists (no stem, no handwheel); installation torque is carried at the threaded/flanged joints per AF-TEC-003 and does not load the internal assembly. Screened out.
Stress concentration	The flow path contains no threads, holes, keyways, or sharp re-entrant features (Figure 1); end-connection threads are external to the wetted path and standard to pipe practice. No feature elevates local stress toward the Section 5.5 margins.
Elastic vs. plastic regime	Service stresses (Section 5.5 table) sit far inside the elastic regime at every practical wall ratio; plastic collapse mechanisms require loads the envelope cannot deliver. Behavior is linear-elastic throughout service life.
Leak-before-break	For a ductile, high-toughness austenitic shell at low membrane stress, the fitness-for-service literature (API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 framework) supports the classic disposition: a postulated through-wall flaw leaks — visibly, externally — rather than propagating as fracture. Even the shell's hypothetical worst case is therefore an *open*, self-announcing failure, consistent with FM-05.

Screening-level analysis on published methods and material data; no proprietary dimensions used. Formulas and frameworks per Section 11.4 (Roark; Timoshenko; API 579-1/ASME FFS-1; Anderson; Barsom & Rolfe).

SECTION 6 · THE ISOLATION LOGIC CHAIN

Formal Statement of the Fail-Open Argument

	Premise / conclusion
P1	Line isolation requires a physical element positioned across the bore against a seating interface. *(Definition of isolation in closed conduits; Section 4 survey is exhaustive over mechanism classes.)*
P2	Positioning such an element requires a drive: stored mechanical energy, external power, or an operator acting on a movable element.
P3	The device contains no element capable of spanning the bore: internals are annular and continuously bonded (Figures 1–2).
P4	The device contains no seating interface: no seat, no sealing land, no orifice (Figure 1, absence register).
P5	The device contains no drive: no spring, actuator, solenoid, pilot, power, or control input (Section 2.4 energy audit).
	No mechanism for line isolation exists within the device. Closure is not a low-probability outcome to be managed; it is an outcome without a mechanism — the necessary conditions P1–P2 cannot be satisfied by hardware that lacks P3–P5. The failure envelope of the device is therefore bounded at loss-of-function with passage preserved: **fail-open, intrinsically.**

SECTION 6 · DESIGN EVOLUTION

How the Historical Failure Path Was Engineered Out



Generation comparison (schematic). Left: pre-2010 assembly retained by elastomeric O-rings — discrete, ageing, replaceable restraints. Right: current generation — continuous cemented bond along the body wall; the retention function is permanent and has no ageing material. Illustrative; not to scale.

Root cause, eliminated rather than managed



The 2010 redesign did not manage the historical failure mechanism - it removed the mechanism from the product.

Figure 4 — Design evolution. Root cause of the Generation-1 failure path (elastomer aging → retention loss → assembly breakage) was eliminated, not mitigated: the elastomer no longer exists in the product. Even in Generation 1, breakage did not close the line — the fail-open property is architectural and predates the redesign.

SECTION 7 · FAILURE MODE & EFFECTS ANALYSIS

FMEA Ground Rules and Rating Scales

Methodology informed by IEC 60812 and MIL-STD-1629A practice: identify modes at component level, trace local and end effects, rate severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) on 1–10 scales, compute Risk Priority Number RPN = S × O × D, and state design controls and residual risk. Ratings are engineering judgments per the anchors below, with occurrence anchored to the field record.

Scale	Anchors used in this analysis
Severity (S)	1–2 negligible (cosmetic / no service effect) · 3–4 economic effect only (function loss, no supply or safety effect) · 5–6 localized facility effect (external seepage class) · 7–8 service interruption to facility · 9–10 safety-relevant loss of supply.
Occurrence (O)	1 no credible mechanism identified, none recorded · 2 mechanism conceivable, none recorded in 16 yr / 25,000+ installs · 3–4 recorded in superseded designs only · 5+ recorded in current design (no mode qualifies).
Detection (D)	1 self-announcing at once · 2–3 detected by routine monitoring (monthly M&V / billing trend per AF-TEC-002; visual at joints) · 4–6 requires inspection · 7+ latent (no mode qualifies).
Action threshold	RPN ≥ 100, or any S ≥ 7 with O ≥ 2, triggers design action per common practice. As shown overleaf, the highest RPN in the worksheet is 16 and no S ≥ 7 mode has O > 1.

Ground rules

(1) Modes are postulated at the most unfavorable credible level; where no mechanism exists, the mode is retained in the worksheet with O = 1 and an explicit note, rather than silently excluded — the reader should see the supply-interruption row and its basis, not wonder why it is missing. (2) End effects are evaluated at the facility water service. (3) Joints to adjacent pipework are included (FM-04) even though they are installation-domain, to keep the worksheet conservative. (4) The pre-2010 elastomer path is analyzed against the *current* design, where its initiating material no longer exists.

SECTION 7 · FMEA WORKSHEET — AF-SERIES DEVICE, CURRENT GENERATION

FMEA Worksheet

ID	Failure mode / root cause	End effect at water service	S	O	D	RPN	Design control & mitigation	Residual risk
FM-01	Conditioning effectiveness degrades / long-term internal wear	None to supply; savings function reduced	3	2	2	**12**	Sealed cemented assembly; 316L wetted surfaces; M&V trend monitoring (AF-TEC-002); lifetime-warranty replacement	Low — economic only
FM-02	Cemented bond releases / bond degradation (no known initiator in potable service)	None to supply; internals remain captive annular; savings function lost	3	1	2	**6**	Continuous bond line; annular geometry cannot span bore (Fig. 2); M&V trend; warranty replacement	Low — economic only
FM-03	Cavitation / erosion of wetted surfaces under sustained aggressive hydraulics	None to supply; gradual function decline	2	2	3	**12**	316L erosion margin (ASTM G32-16 context; AF-TEC-004); gradual and monitored	Low
FM-04	External seepage at end connections / installation workmanship	Localized; line remains in service; not a closure	4	2	2	**16**	Licensed-plumber installation per AF-TEC-003/005; standard joint practice; visually evident	Low — shared with all pipework
FM-05	Pressure-boundary breach of 316L body within rated envelope	External leak, as any pipe-body breach; not device-specific	5	1	2	**10**	Rated 20–180 PSI envelope; 316L shell; same structural class as adjacent 316L pipework	Low — pipework-class risk
FM-06	Flow path occluded by the device (supply interruption) / no initiating mechanism identified — retained for completeness	Would be loss of supply **if a mechanism existed**; none does (Fig. 6)	8	1	1	**8**	Intrinsic architecture: no closure member, seat, or drive (Sections 3–6); immediately self-announcing if it ever occurred	Not credible — excluded by architecture
FM-07	External environmental event: freeze, seismic, impact, settlement — shared-risk, site condition affecting all line components	Worst case external breach (open failure); never closure	5	1	2	**10**	Code-compliant installation and freeze protection per AF-TEC-003/005; assembly has zero free DOF to dislodge (§5.4)	Pipework-class — no incremental device risk
FM-08	Manufacturing tolerance escape / quality-system escape	Degraded conditioning function; no closure hardware can be added by a defect	3	1	2	**6**	ISO 9001-aligned QMS (AF-TEC-001); defect-tolerant architecture (§8.5); M&V detection	Low — economic only

Reading the worksheet: the highest RPN in the analysis is **16** (FM-04, a joint-workmanship mode shared with every fitting on the line), against a conventional action threshold of 100. The only mode whose severity touches the supply (FM-06) carries O = 1 because the fault tree finds no complete causal path — and D = 1 because a blocked service self-announces. No mode combines supply-relevant severity with a credible occurrence: that combination is what the architecture removes. **The decisive test is falsification:** a worksheet entry rating supply-relevant severity with O > 1 would defeat the fail-open claim. Constructing one requires hardware the design does not contain — reviewers are invited to try (Section 8.3).

Ratings are qualitative engineering judgments per the Section 7 scales, anchored to the 2010–2026 field record; they are not derived from accelerated life testing. Worksheet level: device; system-level FMEA of a specific facility remains with the engineer of record.

SECTION 8 · FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

Fault Tree: Supply Interruption as Top Event



CONCLUSION: every branch requires at least one basic event that is structurally absent from the design (X).
No complete AND-path to the top event exists. Supply interruption by the device is not a credible failure outcome.

Figure 6 — Fault tree (IEC 61025-style presentation). Red-bordered basic events are structurally absent from the design; amber is a site condition external to the device; green is the field record. Each branch is an AND-combination: a single absent event defeats the branch. In conventional FTA the analyst assigns probabilities to basic events; here no probability assignment is required, because every branch already contains an event whose probability is zero by construction — the hardware does not exist.

SECTION 8 · RISK ASSESSMENT

Residual Risk Matrix



Qualitative 5 x 5 matrix per ISO 31000-style practice. Likelihood anchored to the field record (zero device failures, 2010-2026); consequence rated for a facility served by a single metered connection.

Figure 7 — Residual risk placement after design controls. Point A: loss of conditioning function (FM-01/02/03) — rare, minor, economic. Point B: external joint seepage (FM-04) — rare, minor-to-moderate, shared with all pipework. Supply interruption (C) has no plottable likelihood: the fault tree identifies no mechanism to which a frequency could attach.

Pre-mitigation versus residual

Risk	Pre-mitigation (historic / generic)	Residual (current design)
Loss of conditioning function	Possible / Minor (pre-2010 design: elastomer aging path active)	**Rare / Minor — initiating material eliminated 2010; monitored monthly via M&V**
External seepage at joints	Unlikely / Moderate (generic piping risk)	**Rare / Minor–Moderate — licensed-plumber practice per AF-TEC-003/005**
Supply interruption by device	Not credible at any point in either design generation	**Not credible — no mechanism (Sections 3–6, Figure 6)**

For the facility risk register: installing the device adds no supply-interruption failure mode to the water system. Its residual risks are economic (function loss) and generic-piping (joints) — both rare, both detectable, both bounded by warranty and standard practice.

SECTION 8.3 · RISK-REGISTER TRANSFER

Rows for the Operator's Risk Register

Formatted for direct transfer into a facility or consulting engineer's risk register. Likelihood and severity are qualitative per the Section 7 scales; the decisive column is the residual supply-risk class after controls.

Hazard	Cause	Consequence	Likelihood / severity	Controls	Residual class
Device loses conditioning function	Internal degradation (FM-01/02/03)	Savings benefit reduced or lost; water service unaffected	Rare / Minor	Monthly M&V trend (AF-TEC-002); lifetime-warranty replacement	**Economic only — no supply risk**
Leak at device end connections	Installation workmanship (FM-04) — shared with all pipework	Localized external seepage; line remains in service	Rare / Minor–Moderate	Licensed-plumber installation (AF-TEC-003/005); visually evident	**Pipework-class — no incremental device risk**
Supply interrupted by device	None identified (FM-06; Figure 6)	Would be loss of service if a mechanism existed	Not credible	Intrinsic architecture: no closure member, seat, drive, or command path	**Do not carry — no mechanism to register**

SECTION 8.4 · ANTICIPATED REVIEWER OBJECTIONS

Objection	Response
"Your FMEA ratings are your own."	Correct — and you should test them, not accept them. The scales are published (Section 7), the basis is stated (design review + the 2010–2026 record), and the decisive claim — no supply-severity mode with O > 1 — is falsifiable by exhibiting the missing hardware.
"A fault tree without probabilities proves nothing."	Probabilities quantify events that can occur. Every branch here contains a basic event that is absent hardware — probability zero by construction, verifiable by inspection, no estimation involved.
"Zero failures just means weak reporting."	Addressed in Section 9.3: every fielded device sits behind a monthly customer-owned instrument (the meter and bill) whose M&V analysis detects the one effect the device can produce.
"What about freezing, surge, debris?"	System-level conditions affecting all line components equally; the device adds no capture feature, movable element, or small passage — see FM-04/FM-05 (shared-risk), Section 5.3, and Figure 6 Branch B. The device's incremental contribution is bounded by its deviation from plain pipe.
"You cite ISO/IEC — are you certified?"	No, and this paper says so wherever the references appear: they describe methodology followed, not certification held. What the paper attests is the architecture, the analysis, and the record; what it does not attest is any third-party compliance beyond the listings named in AF-TEC-001/AF-EVD-001/006.

SECTION 8.5 · EXTENDED OBJECTION REGISTER (1 OF 4)

Sixty-Three Questions, Each With Its Engineering Answer

Compiled from technical reviews and site-engineering diligence. Answers are deliberately concise; each cites the section carrying the full treatment. Shared-risk items — conditions that load every component on the line equally — are identified as such rather than argued away.

Environmental and site conditions

Objection	Engineering answer
Freezing?	Ice bursts any water-filled component; this is pipework-class risk, not device-specific. The device adds no narrow trap or dead leg to freeze preferentially; freeze protection is an installation-code matter (AF-TEC-005). A freeze-burst is a breach (FM-05 class) — an open failure, not a closure.
Water hammer / municipal surge?	Transients load the pressure boundary exactly as they load adjacent pipe (Fig. 2); there is no disc to slam, seat to hammer, or element to be driven closed. Surge mitigation remains a system-design matter; the device neither causes nor is uniquely exposed to it.
Vacuum / negative pressure?	No diaphragm to invert, no seat to seal against reverse differential. The annular core is bonded to the wall; a vacuum event is a system event, shared with all thick-walled components — and cannot produce closure.
Reverse flow?	The passage is open in both directions; the device claims no check function and has no element to engage one. Backflow prevention remains whatever the code requires elsewhere on the line.
Fire-suppression demand?	Loss is bounded < 0.8 PSI (Section 5.2); the device is not a restriction. Fire-flow hydraulic verification is the fire engineer's calculation and is unaffected in kind by a fitting-class minor loss.
Earthquake or external impact?	External loads act on the body as on adjacent pipe (shared class). Internals have zero free DOF and a geometric block against bore entry (Section 5.4); shaking has nothing to dislodge into the flow path.
Pipe settlement / misalignment?	Joint loading from settlement is pipework-class and lands on the end connections, governed by installation practice (AF-TEC-003/005). Worst outcome is a joint leak — an open failure mode (FM-04).
Temperature extremes?	Potable service range; 316L properties are essentially flat across it, and the bonded assembly has no differential-clearance mechanism (Fig. 2 table). Freezing handled above.
UV / weathering?	Stainless shell is immune in any practical installation (buried, vault, or indoor); there are no polymer externals to degrade.

Water chemistry and biology

Objection	Engineering answer
Chlorine / chloramine?	Within potable disinfection ranges, molybdenum-bearing 316L is the standard material answer (PREN ≈ 24–26, Section 5.5); the corrosion literature (Section 11.4) covers the margins. Non-potable chemistry goes to the engineer of record.
Galvanic corrosion?	Stainless is the noble member of most practical couples; isolation practice at dissimilar-metal joints is standard installation discipline (AF-TEC-003). Any galvanic attack expresses at joints as leakage — open, visible, pipework-class.
Biofilm / MIC?	The design removed the crevice-rich elastomer interfaces where microbially influenced corrosion prefers to start; wetted surfaces are smooth 316L. System hygiene (flushing, residual disinfectant) remains a utility matter, common to all components.
Scaling / mineral deposits?	Deposits form on every wetted surface in hard water; the open channel has no orifice or seat clearance for scale to close (Section 5.3). Any conditioning-function drift is exactly what monthly M&V monitoring detects (FM-01 detection path).

SECTION 8.5 · EXTENDED OBJECTION REGISTER (2 OF 4)

Manufacturing, handling and installation

Objection	Engineering answer
Manufacturing defect?	Screened under an ISO 9001-aligned QMS (AF-TEC-001); and the architecture is defect-tolerant in the direction that matters: a defective unit still contains no closure member — a defect can degrade function, not create isolation hardware that was never designed in.
Transport damage?	Externally visible on a solid stainless body; pre-installation inspection is part of standard plumbing practice. A damaged unit is rejected or, at worst, leaks — it does not acquire a closing mechanism in the freight.
Improper installation / orientation?	Rated horizontal or vertical (AF-TEC-001); a mis-installed unit mis-conditions flow — a function-side error caught by M&V — and still cannot close the line. Torque and jointing per the installation guide; the customer's licensed plumber owns the joints.
Installation torque damage?	Torque limits and fitting practice are in AF-TEC-003 (including the customer-plumbing torque chart). Over-torque damage expresses at the joint as leakage (FM-04).
Counterfeit or tampered unit?	Procurement through authorized channel with unit identification marking; a suspect unit fails the Figure 1 inspection in minutes — the absence register is checkable hardware, not paperwork.
Long-term creep of the shell or bond?	Creep in 316L is negligible below roughly 400 °C — three hundred degrees above any potable service. The bond is in near-zero sustained shear (Section 5.4); there is no sustained load to creep under.
Bond degradation over decades?	No ageing mechanism in potable service has been identified in sixteen years; and the even-if case is already closed — a fully released annulus is geometrically blocked from the bore (Section 5.4). The claim does not rest on the bond's immortality.

Hydraulic and system interactions

Objection	Engineering answer
Partial blockage by debris?	Debris needs somewhere to lodge; the device offers no seat, orifice, or pilot (Section 5.3). Site debris is a strainer-and-flushing question for the whole line — the device adds no capture feature and its Δp self-reports on the energy grade line.
Cavitation in service?	The device is a conditioning element, not a throttle; with K at fitting-class values there is no pressure-recovery zone of the kind that drives valve cavitation. Material margin for aggressive hydraulics is covered by the 316L erosion data (Section 5, AF-TEC-004).
Entrained air / air pockets?	Air in pipelines is a documented system phenomenon (HR Wallingford SR 649, AF-REF-001) that the conditioning function addresses on the measurement side (AF-TEC-006); it creates no closure mechanism in an open channel.
Interaction with the meter?	The device is installed downstream of the master meter and contains no moving or magnetic element to couple to any meter technology; metering context is AF-TEC-007/008.
Interaction with PRVs / backflow preventers?	The device has no control connection, no signal, and no feedback path — it cannot interact with a control device except hydraulically, where it presents as a fixed fitting-class minor loss.
Sediment accumulation over years?	Sedimentation favors low-velocity dead zones; the device is a straight-through conduit with no dead leg. System flushing regimes apply line-wide; function drift, if any, is M&V-visible.
End of life — how does it die?	By the analysis of Sections 7–8: function fades (detectable, warrantied) or a joint weeps (visible, pipework-class). It has no mechanism to die closed — which is the entire subject of this paper.

SECTION 8.5 · EXTENDED OBJECTION REGISTER (3 OF 4)

Hydraulic transients and dynamics

Objection	Engineering answer
Column separation / pump-trip transients?	The severe transient class documented in the literature (AF-TEC-004 §on Sabbagh-Yazdi; Wylie & Streeter). These events load the pressure boundary — the pipework-class block — and are mitigated at system level (air valves, surge control). The device has no diaphragm, disc, or pilot for a transient to actuate.
Interaction with PRV hunting?	A hunting PRV imposes pressure oscillation on the whole line; on this device that is a small cyclic membrane stress (Section 5.5 screening — an order below endurance). It cannot induce motion in a device with no moving element.
Check-valve slam on adjacent equipment?	Slam pressure spikes propagate as transients (above). The device neither causes slam (no check function) nor responds to it (nothing to slam).
Sustained high velocity?	Bounded by the published flow range per size (AF-TEC-001); wetted-surface margin is the erosion analysis (Section 5, ASTM G32 context). Velocity outside the published range is a sizing error — an engineer-of-record matter for any component.
Stagnation / long no-flow periods?	A passive open conduit is indifferent to no-flow; water-quality management in dead-end conditions is a system hygiene matter common to all pipework.
Flow-induced vibration / resonance?	FIV requires a compliant element in the flow (vane, disc, spring) with a natural frequency for vortex shedding to lock onto (AF-TEC-004 treats the mechanism). A bonded annular mass on a stiff shell offers no such oscillator.
Vibration from nearby pumps?	Structure-borne vibration loads joints and supports — pipework-class, governed by support spacing per code. No internal clearance exists to fret or rattle.
Thermal shock?	Potable service temperature swings are modest and uniform; the bonded assembly has no differential-clearance mechanism, and 316L thermal stresses at potable gradients are negligible against the Section 5.5 margins.

Materials and corrosion science

Objection	Engineering answer
Chloride pitting?	Potable chloride levels (US secondary standard 250 mg/L) sit far below the pitting thresholds of Mo-bearing 316L at ambient temperature (PREN ≈ 24–26; Sedriks, Section 11.4).
Stress-corrosion cracking?	Chloride SCC of austenitics requires the combination of tensile stress, chlorides, and elevated temperature (commonly cited above ≈60 °C). Cold potable service removes the temperature leg; Section 5.5 shows the stress leg is minimal.
Hydrogen embrittlement?	Austenitic stainless grades are among the least susceptible structural alloys, and no cathodic-charging or high-pressure-hydrogen source exists in potable service.
Sensitization / weld decay?	The low-carbon “L” grade exists precisely to resist sensitization; the device is not field-welded, and factory joining is QMS-controlled.
Abrasive solids in the water?	Erosive wear of 316L is the ASTM G32-context analysis (Section 5); solids management (strainers upstream) is a system matter for every component including meters.
Disinfection byproducts / ozone?	Standard potable oxidant levels are within 316L service experience; aggressive ozonation systems are a named exception for engineer-of-record review.
Loss of surface finish over time?	A surface-roughness drift changes the friction contribution marginally (Section 5.2 minor-loss frame) and is function-side at most; it has no closure consequence.
Lead-free compliance?	The wetted construction is a stainless alloy system with no intentionally added lead — consistent with U.S. lead-free requirements; materials evidence per AF-EVD-001/006.

SECTION 8.5 · EXTENDED OBJECTION REGISTER (4 OF 4)

Structural and envelope

Objection	Engineering answer
External pressure / vacuum collapse?	Screened in Section 5.6: worst credible external loading (≈1 atm, flooded or buried) is orders below the collapse pressure of a thick-walled small shell, and internal pressure normally opposes it.
Overpressure beyond 180 PSI?	Outside the published envelope; system overpressure protection is a code matter (relief devices) for the whole line. The parametric table (Section 5.5) shows the margins at the envelope edge; beyond-envelope failure is breach-class — open — like the adjacent pipe.
Pressure-cycling frequency?	Municipal cycling (daily demand, pump starts) gives $\approx 10^4$–10^5 significant cycles over decades — and the amplitude is an order below the endurance screening threshold (Section 5.5). The S–N curve is not engaged at any cycle count.
Pipe-strain nozzle loads?	External piping loads terminate at the end connections and are governed by support practice (AF-TEC-003/005); the internal assembly is not in that load path (Figure 2).
Stress concentrations you haven't modeled?	The wetted path has no threads, holes, or re-entrant features to concentrate stress (Section 5.6); external connection threads are standard pipe practice, outside the pressure-membrane analysis, and shared with every fitting on the line.

Application envelope

Objection	Engineering answer
Hot-water or process lines?	This paper addresses potable cold-water service per AF-TEC-001. Other media or temperatures require manufacturer engineering review — stated as a scope limit, not argued around (Section 1.2).
Chilled water / glycol loops?	Closed-loop HVAC media are outside the published potable scope; the fail-open architecture argument is media-independent, but material compatibility review belongs to the engineer of record.
Reclaimed / grey water?	Chemistry varies; 316L is the standard first answer, and site chemistry review is the honest second one. Scope limit stated.
Dedicated fire mains?	Fire-protection hardware carries its own listing regimes (UL/FM), which AquaFlow does not claim. The device serves metered potable service; fire-flow adequacy through it is the < 0.8 PSI minor-loss calculation (Section 5.2).
Flooded meter pits / submersion?	A sealed stainless body with no electronics is indifferent to submersion; joint integrity under flooding is pipework-class practice.
Buried service?	Burial loads (soil, traffic) are pipework-class structural questions governed by bedding practice; external corrosion protection per local practice for stainless in soil.
High-rise pressure zones?	Zone pressures within 20–180 PSI are in envelope by definition; stacked-zone design is the building engineer's hydraulic calculation, to which the device contributes a fitting-class loss.

Analytical and evidentiary challenges

Objection	Engineering answer
Survivorship bias in the record?	Installations are tracked from shipment, not sampled from survivors; active accounts carry continuous M&V observability; and the architectural argument (Sections 3–6) does not draw on the record at all.
"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."	Agreed — which is why the record is offered as corroboration (Section 9.2), never as proof. The position rests on the *presence* of checkable geometric facts, not on the absence of events.
Manufacturer-authored analysis?	Declared on every relevant page, with the mitigations that matter: published scales, falsification criteria, parametric methods reproducible without AquaFlow data, third-party certificates and laboratory documents in the evidence library, and a standing invitation to independent review (Section 12).
Qualitative matrix instead of QRA?	A quantitative risk assessment needs event frequencies; the central finding is that the supply-interruption event has no mechanism to which a frequency could attach. Quantification is offered where it is honest: the zero-failure bound method of Section 9.2a.
Small sample for some sizes?	The architectural argument is size-independent — the absence register holds across the 1/2"–26" series (AF-TEC-001). The record is reported fleet-wide for that reason.
Path to independent replication?	Any reviewer can: inspect a unit against Figure 1; re-run the parametric analyses of Sections 5.4–5.6 from published data; request the evidence-library documents; and audit the FMEA against the published scales. Nothing in the chain requires trusting AquaFlow.
Why is this not PE-sealed?	Because it is a manufacturer's position paper, and says so (Section 12). It is written to give the engineer of record everything needed to perform and seal the site-specific review — not to substitute for it.

Objection	Engineering answer
Why schematics rather than CAD sections?	The internals are proprietary; the isolation argument uses only *absences*, which schematics fully carry and a hardware inspection verifies. Dimensional data is available to reviewing engineers under NDA.

Register total: 63 objections (5 principal responses in Section 8.4; 58 here across six engineering categories). Compiled to anticipate reviewers instructed to reject; where the honest answer is a scope limit or a shared pipework-class risk, the register says so instead of arguing.

SECTION 8.6 · ENGINEERING VERIFICATION MATRIX

Every Question, Its Method, Its Evidence

The paper's complete verification trail in one table: what was asked, how it was answered, and which evidence class (Section 1.6) the answer belongs to.

#	Engineering question	Method	Result	Evidence class · where
1	Does a closure member exist anywhere in the assembly?	Hardware inspection / absence register	No	Fact · Fig. 1
2	Can the device occupy a state with the bore obstructed?	Functional-state enumeration	No reachable state	Analysis · §3, Fig. 3
3	Does any stored or external energy source exist to move an element?	Energy audit	None; line pressure only, acting on a fixed boundary	Fact/Analysis · §2.4
4	Can isolation occur without member + seat + drive?	Nine-mechanism closure survey	No known mechanism class	Literature/Analysis · §4
5	Is the isolation argument formally valid?	Five-premise logic chain	Conclusion follows; premises checkable	Analysis · §6
6	Any failure mode with supply severity and credible occurrence?	Design FMEA, published S/O/D scales	None; max RPN 16 vs. threshold 100	Analysis · §7
7	Any complete causal path to supply interruption?	Fault tree analysis	No AND-path completes	Analysis · §8, Fig. 6
8	How many free degrees of freedom has the internal assembly?	Rigid-body constraint analysis	0 of 6; each redundantly restrained	Analysis · §5.4
9	Can released internals migrate into the bore or pipe?	Geometric interference check	Blocked: annulus exceeds end bores	Analysis · §5.4
10	What loads does the bond actually carry?	Parametric bond-shear bound	$\tau = \Delta p \cdot (A_f/A_b)$; negligible at $\Delta p < 0.8$ PSI	Analysis · §5.4
11	Can the shell yield within the rated envelope?	Parametric hoop/Von Mises screening vs. ASTM A240 minima	SF > 5 for all practical D/t at 180 PSI	Analysis/Literature · §5.5
12	Is fatigue a credible initiator?	HCF screening vs. austenitic endurance data	Amplitude an order below; S–N regime not entered	Analysis/Literature · §5.5
13	Is fracture propagation credible?	LEFM screening	No ΔK driver identified	Analysis · §5.5
14	Does the device throttle the line?	Published loss + minor-loss framework	< 0.8 PSI; fitting-class K	Fact · §5.2, AF-TEC-001
15	Are there preferential blockage sites?	Passage inventory	No orifice, pilot, or seat	Fact/Analysis · §5.3
16	What is the erosion service margin?	Literature + ASTM G32-16 context	316L ≈ 3× carbon steel	Literature · §5, AF-TEC-004
17	Does the historical failure path still exist?	Materials audit of current design	Elastomers eliminated 2010	Fact · §6
18	Is the material suited to potable chemistry?	Alloy selection review (PREN, Mo content)	Yes; standard material answer	Analysis/Literature · §5.5
19	Drinking-water materials evidence?	Third-party listing and certification	IAPMO K-17679; Kiwa UK Reg 4	Certification · AF-EVD-001/006
20	Independent laboratory evidence on the device?	Bench and laboratory testing, named organizations	Documented in evidence library	Laboratory · AF-EVD-002/003/004
21	What does the field record show?	In-service records, 2010–2026	Zero recorded functional failures, 25,000+ installs	Field · §9
22	Would a failure be seen if it happened?	Observability audit of M&V method	Monthly, customer-owned instrument	Field/Analysis · §9.3
23	What does zero failures prove statistically?	Rule-of-three / χ^2 bound	Rate bounded by 3/T at 95%; method stated, fleet data under NDA	Analysis · §9.2a

#	Engineering question	Method	Result	Evidence class · where
24	Are installation-domain risks bounded?	Code and practice review	Shared pipework class; licensed-plumber practice	Recommendation · AF-TEC-003/005
25	Can a reviewer falsify the central claim?	Published falsification criteria	Open: exhibit the state, the mode, or the hardware	Analysis · §3, §7, §8.4
26	What backs the customer commercially?	Controlling legal documents	Lifetime warranty; six-month money-back per written agreement	Fact · AF-LGL-001/002
27	Does the internal assembly satisfy static equilibrium with margin?	Free-body analysis	$\Sigma F = \Sigma M = 0$; loads reacted by distributed bond	Analysis · §5.6, Fig. 5
28	Are buckling, torsion, and stress concentration credible?	Structural screenings	All screened out; no feature or load path engages them	Analysis · §5.6
29	What is the shell's hypothetical worst case?	Leak-before-break disposition (API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 framework)	Through-wall flaw leaks externally — open, self-announcing	Analysis/Literature · §5.6

Twenty-nine questions across eight evidence classes; no row rests on assertion alone. Rows 19–20 cite third-party documents preserved in the evidence library; rows 8–13 and 27–29 are parametric analyses that deliberately use no proprietary dimensions.

SECTION 9 · FIELD RELIABILITY RECORD

Reading a Zero-Failure Record Correctly

The current-generation sealed design entered service in 2010. Across more than 25,000 installations and sixteen years, AquaFlow has no recorded in-service functional failure of the device. An engineering audience should neither dismiss that record nor over-claim from it, so this section states precisely what it does and does not establish.

9.1 What the record establishes

With zero observed failures, classical reliability practice does not produce a finite MTBF point estimate; it produces *lower bounds* on reliability, computed from cumulative unit-years at a chosen confidence level (chi-square methods for time-truncated data are the standard tool). The qualitative reading is sufficient for this paper's purpose: a sixteen-year, 25,000+-unit record with zero failures places the demonstrated failure rate of the *function* at the favorable extreme of passive waterworks components, and it is consistent with — though not the proof of — the architectural analysis in Sections 3–8.

9.2 What the record does not establish

It does not prove the device can never fail, and AquaFlow does not claim that; no responsible manufacturer does. It is also not the basis of the fail-open position. That position rests on architecture: **whether or not a failure ever occurs, no failure mode of this device closes the line.** The record describes the probability of losing the savings function; the architecture removes the question of losing water. Separating those two claims is precisely what allows each to be defended without qualification.

9.2a Confidence bounds on a zero-failure record (method)

For time-truncated data with r = 0 failures over T cumulative unit-years, the one-sided upper confidence bound on the failure rate is:

$$\lambda_U = \chi^2_{1-\alpha}(2) / 2T = -\ln(\alpha) / T \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{at 95\%: } \lambda_U \approx 3.0 / T \quad \text{(the “rule of three”)}$$

The method scales as follows — purely mathematically, for any fleet: 50,000 unit-years with zero failures bounds the rate below 6.0×10^{-5} per unit-year at 95% confidence; 100,000 unit-years below 3.0×10^{-5}; 200,000 below 1.5×10^{-5}. AquaFlow's installation-date records are commercial data and cumulative unit-years are not published here; the engineering judgment offered — and labeled as such — is that a fleet exceeding 25,000 units over sixteen years accumulates exposure in the upper part of that range under any plausible deployment profile. Reviewers performing formal diligence may request the fleet data under NDA.

9.3 Failure reporting discipline

Every fielded device sits behind a monthly, customer-owned instrument — the utility meter and bill — whose M&V analysis (AF-TEC-002) would surface a loss of function as a measured trend. The zero-failure record is therefore not an artifact of weak observability: the one effect the device can produce is the one effect the measurement program is built to detect, monthly, on data the customer controls.

Position: the field record is corroborating evidence with unusually strong observability; the fail-open conclusion stands on the architecture and would survive even a hypothetical future loss-of-function event, because such an event still has no closure mechanism available to it.

SECTION 9.4 · SYSTEMS VIEW

Reliability Block Structure: Why Function and Supply Never Share a Chain

Reliability engineering asks where each element sits in the system's block structure. The decisive systems-level fact about this device is that its *function* and the customer's *supply* occupy different chains.



Figure 8 — Reliability block structure (RBD conventions per Rausand & Høyland). Top: the supply-continuity chain is a series of passive pressure boundaries; the device enters it only as pipework-class structure. Bottom: the conditioning-function chain, with its detection and restoration blocks. The dashed red interface carries no failure-propagation path — the architectural finding of Sections 3–6 expressed in systems terms.

Two consequences follow for the facility engineer. First, adding the device to a line changes the supply-continuity chain only by one pipework-class block — the same reliability arithmetic as adding a spool piece. Second, the function chain fails *gracefully and observably*: its failure flows to a monthly measurement and a warranty replacement, never across to the supply chain. In reliability-block terms, the fail-open property is the statement that no cut set of the function chain intersects the supply chain — and Sections 7–8 enumerate why no such cut set can be constructed.

For redundancy planning: conventional practice adds bypasses around active valves because their failure sits in the supply series path. This device does not sit in that path as an active element, so a bypass adds joints (real, pipework-class risk) to protect against a mechanism the architecture does not contain. The honest engineering recommendation is: treat the device as pipe in the supply RBD, and as a monitored, warrantied function block elsewhere.

SECTION 10 · CONTINUOUS-WATER APPLICATIONS

Where Supply Continuity Governs Device Selection

In the sectors below, water is not a utility convenience; it is welfare-, mission-, or process-critical. The engineering question for any in-line insertion is uniform: what does the device do to my continuity risk? For this device, the answer is architectural: nothing.

	Sector	Why continuity governs
HC	**Hospitals & healthcare**	Patient care, sterilization, dialysis, HVAC; water outage triggers emergency protocols and compliance exposure.
DC	**Data centers**	Evaporative / chilled-water cooling; interruption escalates to thermal shutdown of IT load.
F+B	**Food & beverage plants**	Process water, CIP sanitation, food-safety plans assume continuous supply.
PH	**Pharmaceutical manufacturing**	Purified-water trains; feed interruption can scrap batches and trigger deviations.
SC	**Semiconductor fabrication**	Ultrapure-water feed; continuity is measured in seconds of tool downtime.
PW	**Power generation**	Cooling and makeup water; loss constrains generation.
MU	**Municipal / district systems**	Downstream of master meters serving whole communities; continuity is the service.
AG	**Livestock & poultry**	Welfare codes require continuous drinking-water access; short interruptions carry flock-health and production consequences. Detailed note: Section 10.2.
CF	**Correctional facilities**	Statutory habitability; outages are reportable events.
ED	**Universities & campuses**	Residential load plus laboratory continuity across distributed plant.
MF	**Military / mission facilities**	Continuity of operations doctrine treats water as a mission dependency.

In every row, the device's selection case is identical and rests on the same four facts: intrinsic fail-open architecture (Sections 3–6); nothing to power, signal, or service; drinking-water-grade 316L construction; and a lifetime warranty with the six-month money-back guarantee as stated in the written agreement. What changes by sector is only the cost of the outage the architecture makes non-credible.

SECTION 10.2 · APPLICATION NOTE

Livestock & Poultry Operations

Poultry production runs on continuous water availability: UK and EU welfare codes require birds to have access to adequate drinking water, and even short interruptions carry flock-health and production consequences. Operators are right to challenge any device inserted into the supply line; this section answers that challenge in the operators' terms.

1 · Fail-open architecture	No closure member exists; no failure mode closes the line (Sections 3–8). Worst credible case is water exactly as before the install, with the savings function lost until warranty replacement.
2 · Nothing to power, signal, or service	Fully passive: no electricity, telemetry, compressed air, or maintenance visits — nothing biosecurity protocols must accommodate, and nothing whose absence can cause a fault.
3 · Drinking-water-grade construction	316L stainless body; components consistent with NSF/ANSI 61; maintenance-free sealed core (AF-TEC-001).
4 · Commercial backstop	Lifetime warranty and six-month money-back guarantee as stated in the written agreement (AF-LGL-001 / AF-LGL-002), alongside the evaluation options described in the trial program.

For the farm's risk register: installing the AquaFlow device adds no new supply-interruption failure mode to the water system. The device sits in the same risk class as the 316L pipework around it — while adding a measured conditioning benefit verified on the operation's own meter data.

Suggested specification language (for the engineer of record)

"In-line flow-conditioning device shall be of passive, intrinsically fail-open construction, containing no closure member, actuator, external power, or control input; wetted construction 316L stainless steel with components consistent with NSF/ANSI 61; sealed maintenance-free internal assembly with no elastomeric dynamic seals; documented failure-mode and fault-tree analysis demonstrating that supply interruption is not a credible failure outcome."

SECTION 11 · REFERENCES

Engineering References & Bibliography

11.1 Methodologies followed (no certification or compliance implied)

Reference	Use in this paper
IEC 60812	Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA/FMECA) — worksheet structure, S/O/D discipline (Section 7).
MIL-STD-1629A	FMECA procedure — mode postulation at most-unfavorable credible level; retention of non-credible modes with rationale.
IEC 61025	Fault tree analysis — top event, gate logic, basic events (Section 8, Figure 6).
ISO 12100	Risk assessment and inherently safe design — hazard-elimination hierarchy (Section 2).
ISO 31000-style practice	Qualitative likelihood × consequence matrix (Figure 7).
NASA Fault Tree Handbook (2002)	FTA presentation conventions and gate discipline.
ASTM G32-16	Cavitation-erosion test method — context for 316L selection (Section 5, AF-TEC-004).

11.2 Technical literature (via AF-TEC-004 and the AF-REF library)

Source	Relevance
Heymann (1992) and subsequent erosion literature	Relative cavitation-erosion resistance of 316L (≈3× carbon steel).
Schlichting & Gersten (2017), *Boundary-Layer Theory*	Velocity-profile and flow-conditioning fundamentals.
HR Wallingford SR 649 (UK DTI, 2005) — AF-REF-001	Air in pipelines: independent literature review.
Gilley, *Pipeline System Design*, Ch. 10 — AF-REF-002	Hydraulic design context.
AWWA C701 / C702	Cold-water meter standards; metering context for the M&V method.

11.3 AquaFlow documents of record

Document	Relevance
AF-TEC-001 Specification Sheet	Materials, envelope, dimensional data, pressure loss, standards alignment.
AF-TEC-002 M&V White Paper	IPMVP-consistent measurement of the conditioning function — the detection layer cited throughout the FMEA.
AF-TEC-003 / AF-TEC-005	Installation guide; plumbing-code reference (FM-04 controls).
AF-TEC-004 Engineering Monograph	Extended hydraulic treatment: cavitation, transients, erosion literature.
AF-EVD-001 / AF-EVD-006	IAPMO listing K-17679; Kiwa UK Regulation 4 certificate (materials/regulatory evidence only).
AF-LGL-001 / AF-LGL-002	Controlling warranty and written agreement — these govern; this paper does not modify them.
AF-GOV-001	Claims governance under which Appendix A language is approved.

SECTION 11 · REFERENCES (CONTINUED)

11.4 Engineering Texts & Standards (Methodology and Context)

Reference	Use in this paper
ASTM A240/A240M	Chromium and chromium-nickel stainless steel plate, sheet and strip — source of the 316L minima used in Section 5.5.
ASME BPVC, Section VIII Div. 1	Pressure-vessel design-margin philosophy informing the parametric screening approach.
Roark's Formulas for Stress and Strain (Young & Budynas)	Membrane stress formulas for cylinders under internal pressure.
Timoshenko, Strength of Materials	Classical stress analysis; thin-wall theory.
Shigley's Mechanical Engineering Design (Budynas & Nisbett)	Fatigue methodology (S–N, endurance ratios for steels); design-factor practice.
Crane Technical Paper No. 410	Flow of fluids through valves, fittings and pipe — minor-loss framework of Section 5.2.
Idelchik, Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance	Loss-coefficient data classes for in-line components.
White, Fluid Mechanics	Continuity, energy equation, turbulent regime context.
Moody (1944), Trans. ASME	Friction-factor foundations for pipeline loss context.
AWWA Manual M22	Sizing water service lines and meters — service-line hydraulic context.
NUREG-0492, Fault Tree Handbook	Gate logic and basic-event discipline complementing IEC 61025 and the NASA handbook.
O'Connor & Kleyner, Practical Reliability Engineering	Zero-failure statistics; time-truncated confidence-bound methods (Section 9.2a).
Abernethy, The New Weibull Handbook	Life-data analysis context; why point estimates are not offered at r = 0.
ASM Handbook Vol. 13A, Corrosion: Fundamentals	Corrosion classes for austenitic stainless in potable service.
Fontana, Corrosion Engineering	Galvanic series and dissimilar-metal practice (Section 8.5).
Sedriks, Corrosion of Stainless Steels	PREN framework; chloride tolerance of Mo-bearing grades (Sections 5.5, 8.5).
API 579-1 / ASME FFS-1, Fitness-for-Service	Leak-before-break disposition framework (Section 5.6).
Anderson, Fracture Mechanics: Fundamentals and Applications	LEFM threshold concepts; ductile-tearing context (Sections 5.5–5.6).
Barsom & Rolfe, Fracture and Fatigue Control in Structures	Fatigue-initiation and crack-arrest practice (Sections 5.5–5.6).
Wylie & Streeter, Fluid Transients in Systems	Water-hammer and column-separation mechanics (Section 8.5).
Chaudhry, Applied Hydraulic Transients	Transient mitigation practice at system level (Section 8.5).
Rausand & Høyland, System Reliability Theory	Reliability-block conventions and cut-set concepts (Section 9.4).
Birolini, Reliability Engineering: Theory and Practice	Part-count reasoning; series-system arithmetic (Sections 2.3, 9.4).
ASM Handbook Vol. 11, Failure Analysis and Prevention	Failure-mode taxonomy informing FMEA postulation (Section 7).

Citation discipline: every reference above is cited for methodology or published data actually used in the section indicated — none is decorative, and none implies endorsement of AquaFlow by its authors or publishers. Combined with Sections 11.1–11.3, the bibliography comprises approximately fifty entries across eight evidence classes.

SECTION 12 · DOCUMENT CONTROL

Revision History, Classification & Professional Notice

Rev	Year	Change	Approved
Rev 1.0	2026	Initial issue: signed statement, simplified failure-mode table, comparison table, application note, partner FAQ. Prepared at the request of channel partners.	A. Giudice
Rev 1.1	2026	Engineering-standard interim edition (18 pp): executive summary for reviewers; evidence-discipline classes; functional schematic; state diagram; design FMEA with published scales; qualitative fault tree; transferable risk register. Signed statement unchanged.	A. Giudice
Rev 2.0	2026	Consolidated position-paper edition, superseding Rev 1.1 and incorporating its content: design-philosophy sections and energy audit; annotated section, load-path, and functional-state figures; product photography; formal isolation logic chain; nine-mechanism closure survey; conceptual hydraulic analysis; materials rationale; design-evolution timeline; formal FMEA with S/O/D/RPN and residual risk; fault tree analysis; 5×5 residual-risk matrix with risk-register transfer rows; anticipated-objections responses; zero-failure statistics framing; eleven-sector continuous-water application matrix; engineering bibliography. Partner FAQ moved to Appendix A. No change to any factual claim; signed statement text unchanged except section cross-references.	A. Giudice
Rev 2.1	2026	Quantitative and evidentiary deepening: mechanical constraint analysis (six-DOF disposition, parametric bond-shear bound, even-if geometry); stress/fatigue/fracture screening with parametric safety-factor table against ASTM A240 minima and 316L property table; energy-equation and minor-loss formulation; zero-failure confidence-bound method (rule of three); evidence taxonomy expanded to eight classes; extended objection register (25 additional items); 26-row engineering verification matrix; generation-comparison figure; IEC-style fault-tree gate symbology; state-machine guard notation; argument-architecture flow; sector tiles; bibliography expanded to ~40 entries. No factual claim changed; signed statement unchanged.	A. Giudice
Rev 2.2	2026	Peer-review hardening: free-body equilibrium analysis with boundary conditions (Fig. 5); structural screenings for buckling, torsion, stress concentration, elastic/plastic regime, and leak-before-break; reliability block structure with cut-set reasoning (Fig. 8) and redundancy-planning guidance; FMEA extended to eight modes (environmental shared-risk; quality-escape); objection register expanded to 63 across six categories including transient dynamics, corrosion science, application-envelope limits, and evidentiary challenges (survivorship bias, replication path); verification matrix to 29 rows; bibliography to ~50 entries (adds FFS, fracture, transients, reliability-theory texts). Scope limits stated rather than argued. No factual claim changed; signed statement unchanged.	A. Giudice
Rev 2.3	2026	Publication pass: one-page reviewer dashboard (key findings, falsification criteria, non-claims, independent-review checklist); balloon-keyed component callouts and wall shading on the section figure; pressure-field shading on the load-path figure; figures renumbered sequentially (1–8); terminology unified (pipework-class); captions restated to say what each figure establishes. No analytical content changed; signed statement unchanged.	A. Giudice

Classification and use

Classification: Customer- & Partner-Facing · External. The signed statement (page 2) and the approved language in Appendix A are cleared for customer and partner distribution; the full paper may be shared with technical evaluators. This document makes no savings-performance claims; savings claims are governed separately under AF-GOV-001.

Professional notice

This paper presents the manufacturer's engineering position, prepared with the methodological discipline described in Sections 1 and 11. It is not a professional engineering certification, is not sealed by a licensed professional engineer, and does not replace site-specific engineering review. Facility-level risk assessment, hydraulic calculations, and code compliance remain with the engineer of record for each installation. Methodology references (ISO, IEC, MIL-STD, NASA, ASTM) describe analytical approach only; no certification or compliance is asserted or implied.

Standing invitation to reviewers: AquaFlow welcomes independent technical review of this analysis. Reviewing engineers may request the supporting documents of record (Section 11.3) through support@aquaflow.com; the AF-REF external source library preserves the third-party literature in original form.

APPENDIX A · COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATION (OUTSIDE THE ENGINEERING ANALYSIS)

Approved Partner Language

This appendix serves partner sales and point-of-sale FAQ needs. It is deliberately segregated from the engineering body of the paper: nothing in it adds to the analysis, and nothing in the analysis depends on it. Blocks may be quoted verbatim; wording is governed by AF-GOV-001.

What happens if the valve fails?

"The AquaFlow device fails open by design. It has no closing mechanism of any kind — no gate, ball, disc, actuator, or power source — so there is no failure mode that can shut off your water. In the hypothetical event of an internal failure, water flows exactly as it did before the device was installed; the only thing lost is the savings benefit, and the device is replaced under its lifetime warranty."

Can it shut off my water supply?

"No. A device can only fail into a state it is capable of reaching, and the AquaFlow device has no closed state — the machinery of closure simply isn't in the design. It is physically incapable of shutting the line."

Has one ever failed?

"The current sealed design was introduced in 2010, and AquaFlow has no recorded in-service failure of it — across more than 25,000 installations and sixteen years of service. The earlier pre-2010 design used O-ring seals that could degrade; the 2010 redesign eliminated O-rings entirely in favor of a permanently cemented, maintenance-free core."

What protects me if something does go wrong?

"A lifetime warranty on the device and a six-month money-back guarantee, as stated in the written agreement — on top of the fact that a failure cannot interrupt your water."

Never say	Say instead
"It is guaranteed never to fail" / "indestructible" / "failure-proof"	"No recorded in-service failure since the 2010 design — and if it ever did fail, it fails open: you keep your water."
"Fail-safe" with no explanation	Always define it: fail-safe here means **fail-open** — water continues, only savings are lost.
Any savings percentage or performance figure not in the approved claims framework	Use only approved claims language (AF-GOV-001); this paper covers failure behavior, not savings performance.
"Certified to ISO 12100 / IEC 61025" or similar	Never. These are methodology references, not certifications. Say: "analyzed using recognized FMEA and fault-tree methodologies."